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I. Background
As the U.S. trade deficit with Japan increased dramatically during the 1980s,
so too did U.S. criticism of Japan's nontariff trade and investment barriers. The
U.S. public increasingly blamed the failure of its goods and services either to
obtain or expand market share in Japan on the existence of those barriers. The
release of the National Trade Estimate Report on April 28, 1989, by Ambassador
Carla Hills, United States Trade Representative (USTR), confirmed to many that
certain Japanese trade practices had essentially closed the Japanese market to
many U.S. businesses. Growing congressional pressure on the Bush administra-
tion to address those allegedly unfair trade practices forced the USTR to cite Japan
on May 25, 1989, under section 301 of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988.1 Thus, a new era in U.S.-Japanese relations had begun.
Sensing the potential for further deterioration of U.S.-Japanese relations
(and the need to neutralize Japan "bashing"), President Bush and former
Japanese Prime Minister Uno announced on July 14, 1989, the creation of a
new "Structural Impediments Initiative" (SII) to identify the fundamental
nontariff barriers to improvement in bilateral trading relationships . Testifying
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1. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901-10013 (hereinafter Trade Act). Section 301, 19 U.S.C. 2420, enables
the U.S. Trade Representative to target "priority foreign countries" and "priority practices" for
retaliatory actions in the event that negotiated solutions are not found.
2. The SII is not the first attempt by the U.S. and other nations to address structural problems.
For example, see the Communique of the 1989 Toronto Summit, programs of the OECD, and the
earlier U.S.-Japan "Structural Dialogues" including exchanges among members of the Japan-U.S.
Business Council.
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during the Senate's SII hearings on July 20, 1989,' Undersecretary of State
Richard McCormack noted:
The purpose of the SII talks is to address structural impediments which are rooted in
regulations, laws, and business practices in the Japanese economy. . . . The S11 talks
... will focus on structural impediments which hinder the process of economic adjust-
ment and which make unnecessarily difficult and expensive normal activities by foreign
firms wishing to do business there.4
During five plenary sessions held from September 1989 to June 1990, the SII
Joint Working Group focused its discussions on seven structural impediments in
the United States and six in Japan. In Japan's case the impediments included
savings and investment, the distribution system, keiretsu relationships, land-use
policies, certain exclusionary practices, and pricing policies. The Working Group
issued its Joint Report on June 28, 1990. 5 Since the release of that initial report,
two Annual Reports have been issued.
Several of the Japanese impediments, such as the distribution system, exclu-
sionary practices, and the keiretsu, relate to the fair trade environment in Japan,
more particularly, the Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act of 1947
(Antimonopoly Act) and the authority of the Fair Trade Commission of Japan
(JFTC) to regulate competition.
II. The Antimonopoly Act
Out of the ashes of World War II arose a new Japan dedicated to establishing
a parliamentary government, which the occupation authorities naively believed
would be based primarily on Western principles of fair and open trade and com-
mercial independence. To accomplish this goal the occupation authorities caused
the dissolution of the anticompetitive, traditional holding companies, or zaibatsu,
which were often blamed for fostering extreme nationalistic sentiments and lead-
ing Japan to overseas aggressions. Then, in order to prevent a rebirth of past
economic inequities and to stimulate competition in Japan, a new commercial
morality was legislated, the cornerstone of which was the Antimonopoly Act,
designed to emulate U.S. antitrust laws.
From the outset, however, Japanese businessmen argued that the Antimonopoly
Act was too rigid, overly restrictive, and in effect, un-Japanese. One commentator
noted that "the rigidity of the Act was viewed by businessmen as presenting
serious obstacles to their economic reconstruction efforts in the difficult postwar
period." 6 Revisions to the Antimonopoly Act in 1949 and 1953 sought to dilute
3. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance of the
United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 594 (1989).
4. Id.
5. Joint Report of the U.S. -Japan Working Group on the Structural Impediments Initiative, June
28, 1990.
6. Michiko Ariga, Antimonopoly Regulations in General, in 5 DoING BuSiNESS IN JAPAN, part
9, ch. 1, sec. 1.02[2] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed.).
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several "non-Japanese" provisions found in it (for example, prohibition of hori-
zontal or vertical restraints and restrictions on certain cartel activities) and to
eliminate close government scrutiny of business activities.
After public embarrassments over price-fixing activities of several Japanese
cartel activities in the late 1960s and early 1970s (for example, petroleum) the
Diet revised the Antimonopoly Act in 1977 to expand, somewhat, the power and
authority of the JFTC. Nevertheless, by the late 1980s the United States questioned
whether the Japanese Government had placed appropriate priority on the proper
enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act. As a result of the SI, during the last
two years the Japanese Government has begun to focus significant attention on
addressing concerns about anticompetitive practices in Japan. Even as of this
writing the process is still evolving, as evident in the recent announcement of new
guidelines to be enacted on research and development activities.
III. Antimonopoly Reform
Once again, under the threat of Western sanctions, the Japanese have responded
with a familiar ring of self-serving reform. Within the SI1 Joint Report, the Japanese
Delegation opined that "maintenance and promotion of fair and free competition
is an extremely important policy objective, which not only serves the interest of the
consumers but also increases new market entry opportunities including those of
foreign companies."' Furthermore, based upon that policy objective, the Japanese
Government committed during the SII to take several actions:
(1) Enhancement of the Antimonopoly Act and its intensified enforcement;
(2) Greater transparency and fairness in administrative guidance and other
government practices;
(3) Encouragement of transparent and nondiscriminatory procurement proce-
dures by private companies; and
(4) Facilitation of patent examination disposal, including a shorter examination
period!
Since the issuance of the Joint Report, the Japanese have partially honored their
promise with a torrid pace of antimonopoly legislative and regulatory reform.
A keynote to the antimonopoly reform was the government's commitment to
strengthen and make more transparent Japan's antimonopoly enforcement poli-
cies. Accordingly, under the auspices of the JFTC, the Advisory Group on Distri-
bution Systems, Business Practices, and Competition Policy (Advisory Group),
chaired by Professor Emeritus Ryuichiro Tachi of Tokyo University, met in
nineteen separate sessions to study the Japanese distribution system and business
practices. 9 As the Advisory Group noted in its report:
7. Joint Report, supra note 5, sec. 1V-1.
8. Id.
9. Distribution Systems, Business Practices and Perspective of Competition Policy-For the
Promotion of Free and Fair Competition and the Protection of Consumers' Interests, Advisory Group
on Distribution Systems, Business Practices, and Competition Policy, June 21, 1990.
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The Japanese economy having accomplished a high level in quantitative terms is now
at a turning point, from the national perspective, to seek the improvement of the quality
of life, in keeping with the elevation of income, as well as attainment of national
welfare while continuing to develop economic activities. Bearing these changes in mind,
economic policies now are required to give full attention to such questions as whether
the systems and practices that have evolved are responsive to the needs of consumers,
and whether the fruits of improved productivity and efficiency are adequately passed
on to consumers. 10
Based on its evaluation of business practices, the Advisory Group concluded
that sweeping changes were required to:
(1) Deal rigorously with price cartels and bid-rigging;
(2) Advance further the swift and accurate handling of unfair trade practices;
and
(3) Secure the transparency of enforcement of the Antimonopoly Act and to
enhance its execution. "
Accordingly, the Advisory Group recommended to the JFTC that new guidelines
be issued "concerning the enforcement of the [Antimonopoly] Act in a timely and
reliable manner.'
' 2
The JFTC lost little time. On September 18, 1990, it issued the first of two
draft guidelines: Guidelines for the Regulation of Unfair Trade Practices in Sole
Distributorships. 3 Then, on January 17, 1991, it issued the draft Antimonopoly
Act Guidelines Concerning Distribution Systems and Business Practices. The
JFTC solicited public comments, to which the JFTC received numerous sub-
mittals. 14
On July 11, 1991, the JFTC issued the Japanese-language version of the final
guidelines (subsequently issued in September 1991 in English). Consisting of
ninety-three pages, The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning Distribution
Systems and Business Practices (Guidelines) were based on
the fundamental principle of creating a free and open market economy where unimpeded
entry is secured and free and unfettered as well as fair competition takes place ...
describ[ing] as precisely as possible what types of business conduct may constitute
violations of the Antimonopoly Act, and nothing in the Guidelines discriminates between
domestic and foreign firms.'
The Guidelines consist of three sections concerning: continuity and exclusive-
ness of business practices among firms, which offers guidance on whether certain
10. Id. at 3.
11. Id. at 8-13.
12. Id. at 9.
13. Issued by the Executive Bureau, Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC).
14. See ABA, Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law and Practice, Joint
Comments on the Japan Fair Trade Commission Antimonopoly Act Enforcement Guidelines Concern-
ing Unfair Trade Practices in Sole Import Distributorship Contracts, Etc., and Distribution Systems
and Business Practices (Apr. 8, 1991), reprinted in 60 ANTITRUST L.J. 291 (1991).
15. Statement of the Fair Trade Commission on the Antimonopoly Act Guidelines Concerning
Distribution Systems and Business Practices, J FTC, July 11, 1991.
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business practices violate the Antimonopoly Act; transactions in distribution,
which offers guidance on legal prohibitions against certain unfair trade practices
of distributors, wholesalers, and retailers in the Japanese distribution process;
and sole distributorships, which offers guidance on when such relationships will
be suspect and the legality of certain restrictive provisions in exclusive distributor-
ship arrangements. In addition, the Guidelines promoted a greater degree of
transparency of enforcement activity by creating, along the lines of the Business
Review Procedure of the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, a prior
consultation system for determining whether a specific business activity is permit-
ted under the Antimonopoly Act.'
6
Immediately, the Guidelines were criticized as not being tough enough. The
Nikkei Weekly reported on July 13, 1991, that "despite the guidelines' tougher
tone, some question whether the [JFTC] commission can be an effective fair trade
watchdog and enforcer. After all, [the new policy] is not a revision of existing
anti-monopoly regulations, . . .it is inevitable that the guidelines will remain
more or less ambiguous .... "," The U.S. Department of Justice, in its comments
to the Guidelines, noted some concern in the ambiguity of the categorization of
possible anticompetitive conduct and suggested that instead of two behavioral
categories of "illegal per se" or "may pose a problem," the JFTC should assign
three categories: "highly likely," "may," and "unlikely" to violate the Antimo-
nopoly Act.i" Despite Japanese disclaimers, there is also concern that the sections
on exclusive distributorship arrangements discriminate against foreign manufac-
turers because the Guidelines presume that Japanese "distributors have less bar-
gaining power than manufacturers, which is not necessarily the case when foreign
manufacturers are depending on Japanese domestic wholesalers, suppliers, and
retailers to penetrate the Japanese market."
19
IV. Antimonopoly Enforcement
Whether or not the new JFTC policy will succeed will depend largely on
whether it will be unduly disruptive of the overall harmony in Japanese
government-business relationships and industrial policies generally. Perhaps the
Guidelines signal a change in policy whereby the government will assert greater
control over the business community and excessive competition in postwar Japan.
Recently there appears to be an emergence of a tougher enforcement environ-
ment. During the 1990 fiscal year, the JFTC made twenty-two recommendations,
more than in any previous year, for formal action, ranging from bid-rigging,
16. See Guidelines, supra note 15, app. II: Prior Consultation System Concerning Distribution
Systems and Business Practices, including a form of application for prior consultation.
17. THE NIKKEI WEEKLY, July 13, 1991, at 4.
18. See INT'L Bus. ISSUES MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1992, at 13.
19. Id. at 14.
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price-fixing, to tie-in violations.2° The JFTC is increasing its investigatory staff
by 30 percent and its enforcement staff from 129 to 180 in fiscal 1992.21 In June
1990 the JFTC announced it would file criminal prosecutions actively against
"vicious and serious" violations of the Antimonopoly Act. In 1991 it published
new measures to alleviate a private plaintiffs burden of proof in damage suits. 22
Other enforcement-related activities or actions include:
(1) an investigation into whether Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Sony
Corp., Toshiba Corp., and Hitachi Ltd., are illegally supporting domestic
prices for TVs, VCRs, video cameras, etc. ;23
(2) an investigation of an alleged cartel among Japan's ink makers, including
a raid on the offices of ten companies; 24
(3) a JFTC Advisory Panel recommendation to terminate the retail price sup-
port system;
25
(4) an increase in fines for illegal cartels from 1.5 percent to 6 percent of sales
during the period of illegal activity;
2 6
(5) indictments in November 1991 of officials in eight chemical companies for
fixing prices of plastic food wrap, the first criminal charges in seventeen
years;" and
(6) in what might be the first recent case on resale price maintenance, the
JFTC announced it would reconsider exemptions to certain cosmetics and
pharmacies and gradual reduction of the number of exemptions.28
Despite the increased activities, the JFTC is facing some opposition from
the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) against raising fines and penalties
substantially.29 Nevertheless, in light of growing foreign and even domestic pres-
sures for increased enforcement activities, fiscal years 1993 and 1994 will likely
20. Information and Opinion from the Fair Trade Commission of Japan, FTC/JAPAN VIEWS,
Sept. 1991, at 9-10.
21. INT'L Bus. ISSUES MONITOR, Jan. 24, 1992, at 14.
22. FTC/JAPAN VIEWS, supra note 20, at 4.
23. Christopher J. Chipello & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Japan Probes Firms'Pricing for Electron-
icS, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1992, at A10.
24. Executive Watchlist, Bus. ASIA, Mar. 9, 1992, at 84.
25. See Japan's FTC Panel Proposes Revamping Fixed Retail Price System for Some Items,
Comtex Online News Service, July 29, 1991.
26. See Japanese Cabinet Clears Stiffer Penalties for Illegal Cartels Under Antimonopoly Law,
60 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 350 (Mar. 7, 1991).
27. See Foreign Authorities Expect to Focus on Mergers and Anticartel Law Enforcement, 62
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 97 (Jan. 30, 1992).
28. See Re-Consideration ofDesignated Item of Goods for Resale Price Maintenance, JFTC Press
Release, Apr. 15, 1992.
29. Some sources close to the LDP and JFTC report that the LDP objected to JFTC plans to raise
the maximum corporate fine to 300 million Yen from the current 5 million Yen amount. 60 Antitrust
& Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at 98.
VOL. 27, NO. 2
JAPANESE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION 539
witness intensified enforcement activities, especially against keiretsu and services
sectors.30
V. Joint Research and Development
Activities: Draft Guidelines
The JFTC issued its most recent draft guidelines on the Antimonopoly Act on
September 10, 1992. Entitled The Antimonopoly Guidelines Concerning Joint
Research and Development (Draft R&D Guidelines), these guidelines address
joint research and development activities which may "exert an anticompetitive
effect."-31 The Draft R&D Guidelines propose to cover two areas of activity:
Research and development practices constituting a per se unreasonable restraint
of trade under the Antimonopoly Act and research and development practices that
will constitute Unfair Trade Practices under the Antimonopoly Act. Specific
research and development activities that are likely to be deemed to violate the
Antimonopoly Act include: restricting a partner's future research and develop-
ment activities on the same subject matter upon completion of the joint research
and development project; restricting a partner's use of or ability to license to a third
party the jointly developed technology; restricting manufacturing or marketing
activities for resulting products; restricting any research and development activi-
ties that use or incorporate the results of the joint research and development
activity; restricting a partner's right to transfer or license improvements in the
results of the jointly-developed technology; and engaging in price-fixing activi-
ties.
Of greater concern is the JFTC's attempt to extend the scope of the Antimonop-
oly Act by: possibly adopting an "effects test" to extraterritorially based joint
research and development activities; allowing the JFTC to defer a decision on any
resulting products, adding confusion and uncertainty to the consultation process;
questioning the legality of joint manufacturing of jointly developed products in
Japan; and challenging joint research and development where the parties appear
to be capable of doing the project alone, even if the joint activity would result in
efficiencies of cost and scale. Confusion also exists as to minimum thresholds and
access to jointly developed technologies.
30. At the beginning of each new year, JFTC officials occasionally informally release plans and
items of enforcement considered to be important for the JFTC during the coming year. In January
1993, Mr. Shigenori Shiota, a member of the Secretariat of the Director General of the JFTC,
announced the following goals:
(i) increasing the staff of the Investigation Department; (ii) aggressive bringing to the Prosecutor General of
accusations against infringers; (iii) promotion of use by injured of article 25 of the Antimonopoly Law; (iv)
preparation of guidelines for enforcement standards; (v) support for corporate compliance programs; (vi) reconsider-
ation of Exceptional Rules, which currently exempt certain goods from enforcement; and (vii) stricter enforcement
of subcontract law.
31. Antimonopoly Guidelines Concerning Joint Research and Development, JFTC, Sept.10,
1992, at 1.
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The scope of the Draft R&D Guidelines is potentially far-reaching. They could
result in broad intervention by the JFTC in the competitive environment. Because
of the referenced concerns, the JFTC received numerous comments. At this
writing, the final guidelines are expected to be published around March 31,
1993.32 Based on the changes made to the earlier Guidelines on Distribution and
Other Business Practices, the JFTC will likely respond positively, but selectively,
to the comments received from government and private sectors.
VI. Conclusion
In summary, the past two years have witnessed a dramatic transformation in
the enforcement environment of Japan's Antimonopoly Act. Such activity is
unlikely to abate. Indeed, in all likelihood it will intensify as Japan undergoes a
major restructuring of its economic and business order. This metamorphosis will
become increasingly more evident as Japan continues to face a serious crisis
brought about by a collision with and within its culture. Whether or not the new
regulatory environment will be procompetitive is of major interest. There is some
growing concern that such "reformist" efforts will merely follow a well-worn
historical path that all too often has led Japan to "self-protection at all costs" when
challenged. If we are not careful, the serious tension that has existed historically
between Japan and U.S. economic interests could materialize in the antimonopoly
arena initially.
32. According to an official of the JFTC, Executive Office, Economic Department, Coordination
Division, the
JFTC learned very much from the comments of companies and organizations. Some comments are adopted, but
some comments are not adopted. The comments not adopted by the JFTC include a recommendation that the JFTC
should publish a second draft and hear comments again. The reason for nonadoption of this comment is that the
JFTC would like to publish final and formal guidelines as soon as possible.
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